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This authorization is to remain in full force and effect until FH has received written or verbal notification from me of termination and FH has had a reasonable opportunity to act on it. To cancel service, please call FH at toll free. Find Account Have an account? Account Number. Name and Address. What Is the Meaning of the Golden Rule? Carson Jesus picked up a nuance of the law that Rabbi Hillel did not.
Mark , 31 Jesus goes much further than instructing His followers to passively avoid harm. The Message paraphrases the verse this way: Here is a simple, rule-of-thumb guide for behavior: Ask yourself what you want people to do for you, then grab the initiative and do it for them.
It assumes, of course, that when we put ourselves in our neighbor's place, we are wise enough not to make any foolish wishes and good enough not to make any evil ones. The Golden Rule was a vital emphasis on empathy and the reciprocity of morality.
The Golden Rule has inspired several subsequent sayings and ethical declarations since its revelation by Jesus. Listed below are some examples of such inspirations:. Essentially this is the negative version of the Golden Rule. This imperative basically dictates to follow the rules that apply to everyone. Share this. This is because it does not direct a specific type of action that can be morally evaluated in itself. Instead, it offers a rationale for generating such rules.
It starts from an abstracted logical ideal, elaborating a theory around it by tracing its logical implications. Of course, philosophy need not start from the beginning when addressing a concept, nor be confined by an original intent or design or its cultural development. The rest is chaff or flourish or unnecessary additives. Still, the distinction between principles and rules may not be as sharp as claimed. General rules rules of legal evidence, for example also can be used to derive more specific rules based on their logics; principles need not be consulted.
Consulting community reciprocity standards or conventions might be one. Thus, do nice things by consulting community standards would proceduralize a rule to generate more specific action directives. Again, no consultation with principles are needed. Most philosophical principles of ethics are explanatory, providing an ultimate ground for understanding prescriptions.
These also can be used to justify moral rationales. The rule is not portrayed, then as a stationary intellectual object notched on the wall of an inquiring mind. It takes on a life for the moral community living its life. This conceives ethical theory on the model of scientific theory, especially a physical theory with its laws of nature. These latter approaches typically use examples of ethical judgments that the author considers cogent, leaving the reader to agree or disagree on its intuitive appeal.
Hare apparently feels that they are. But wishes, choices, preferences, and feelings of gladness certainly do not seem the same thing.
Choices can come from wishes, though they rarely do, and one feels glad about the results of choices, if not wishes, generally. Choosing is usually endorsing and expressing a want, whether or not it expresses a preference among desired objects.
This is a tricky phrase. An alternative rendering is how you prefer they treat you, singling out the want that has highest priority for you in this peculiar context of mutual reciprocity, not necessarily in general. Further alternatives are treatments we would accept, or acquiesce in or consent to as opposed to actively and ideally choose or choose as most feasible.
These are four quite different options. Or would we have others do unto us as we believe or expect they should treat us based on our or their value commitments and sense of entitlement? Are the expectations of just the two or three people involved to count, or count more than the so-called legitimate expectations of the community?
Such interpretations can ride the rule of gold in quite different directions, led by individual tastes, group norms, or transcendent religious or philosophical principles. And we might see some of these as unfair or otherwise illegitimate. In such contexts, philosophical analysis usually answers questions, clarifying differences in concepts, meanings and their implications. I may choose, wish or want that you would treat me with great kindness and generosity, showing me an unselfish plume of altruism.
But if I then was legitimately expected to reciprocate out of consistency, I might consent, agree, or acquiesce only in mutual respect or minimal fairness, at most.
From this consent logic we move toward Kantian or social contract versions of mutual respect and a sort of rational expectation that can be widely generalized. But we move very far from the many spirits of the golden rule, wishful and ideal. We move from expanding self-regard other-directedly to hedging our bets, which makes great moral difference. In psychology, by contrast, it has been identified with self-esteem and locus of control.
These are quite different orientations, setting different generalizable expectations in oneself and in others. It is not clear that generalizing self-love captures appropriate other-love.
Common opinion has it that love of others should be more disinterested and charitable than love of self, or self-interest. We feel that it is fine to be hard on ourselves on occasion, but more rarely hard on others. We are our own business, but they are not. They are their own business. It seems morally appropriate to sacrifice our own interests but not those of others even when they are willing. We should not urge or perhaps even ask for such sacrifice, instead taking burdens on ourselves.
Joys can be shared, but not burdens quite as much. We are to be nicer, fairer, and more respectful of others than of ourselves. In fact, ethics is about treating others well, and doing so directly. To treat ourselves ethically is a kind of metaphor since only one person is involved in the exchange, and the exchange can only be indirect. We are not held blameworthy for running our self-esteem down when we think we deserve it, but we are to esteem others even when they have not earned it.
Kant, by contrast, poses equal respect for self and other, with little distinction. We are to treat humanity, whether in ourselves or others, as an end in itself and of infinite value. He also poses second-rung duties to self and other toward the pursuit of happiness—a rational, and so self-expressively autonomous, approach to goods.
This might be thought to raise a serious question for altruism—the benefiting of others at our expense. Given duties to self and duties to others, even pertaining to the pursuit of happiness, it is not clear what the grounds would be for preferring others to oneself.
Yet one would be honored as generous, the other selfish. Throughout his ethical works and essays on religion, however, Kant speaks of philanthropy, kindness, and generosity in praising terms without giving like credit to self-interest. Some would criticize this penchant for treating others better than ourselves as a Christian bias against self-interest, too often cast as selfishness.
But it seems in line with the very purposes of ethics, which is how to interact with others, not oneself. Most of the population originally introduced to the golden-rule family of rules was uneducated and highly superstitious, even as most may be today. The message greets most of us in childhood. Its Christian trappings growing most, at present, in politically oppressive third-world oligarchies where sophisticated education is hard to come by.
Likely the rule was designed for such audiences. It was designed to serve them, both as an uplifting inspiration and form of edification, raising their moral consciousness. Selman Otherwise well-educated and experienced folk can be remarkably unskilled at such perspective-taking tasks.
How we properly balance empathy with cognitive role-taking is a greater sticking point, plaguing psychological females and feminist authors as much as the rest. Such integration problems make it unclear how to follow the golden rules properly in most circumstances. And that is quite a drawback for a moral guideline, if the rule is an action guideline.
We might then be advised to seek a different approach such as an interpersonal form of participatory democracy, as was previously noted. Again, these are precisely the sorts of uncertainties and questions that philosophical analysis and theory is supposed to help answer by moving from common sense to uncommonly good sense.
But at some point they move to considerations that serve distinctly theoretical and intellectual purposes, removed from everyday thinking and choice. Their morally relevant qualities cannot compete in importance with our other personal features. Indeed, we cannot identify with, much less respect these one-sided, disembodied essences enough to overrule the array of motivations and personal qualities that match our sense of moral character and concern. The theoretical rationality of maximizing good, even with prudence built in, is obviously extremist and over-generalized.
But as philosophers say, the logics of good and reason in Utilitarianism cannot help but extend to maximization—it is simply irrational, all things considered, to pursue less of a good thing when one can acquire more good at little effort.
If so, then perhaps all the worse generalization and consistency, which will be avoided by being reasonable and personable. Many of us wish theory to upgrade common sense, not throw it out the window with the golden rationale in tow. Both present and likely future philosophical accounts may be unhelpful in bringing clarity to the golden rule in its own terms, rather distorting it through overgeneralization.
Still, the crafting of general theory in ethics is an important project. It exposes ever deeper and broader logics underlying our common rationales, the golden rule being one. It is important for some to review these fundamental issues for treating the golden rule philosophically. Relative to a commonsense understanding of the golden rule, it is a heady conceptual experience to see this simple rule of thumb universalized—inflated to epic proportions that encompass the entire blueprint for ethical virtue, reasoning, and behavior for humankind.
Such is the case with Kantian and Utilitarian super-principles. Now to see that faith reinforced by the most rigorous standards of secular reasoning is quite an affirmation. It can also be recruited as a powerful ally in fending off secular criticism. Often we fail to recognize that extreme reductionism is the centerpiece of the mainstream general theory project.
The whole point is to render the seemingly diverse logics of even conflicting moral concepts and phenomena into a single one, or perhaps two. It is very surprising to find how far a rationale can be extended to cover types of cases beyond its seeming ken—to see how much the virtues of golden kindness or respect, for example, can be recast as mere components of a choice process.
Character traits, as states of being, appear radically different from processes of deliberation, problem solving, and behavior after all. But the most salient psychological features of virtuous traits fade into the amoral background once the principled source of their moral relevance and legitimacy is redefined. Universalization reveals how the basically sound rationale of the golden rule can go unexpectedly awry at full tilt. This shows a hidden chink in its armor.
But reducing principles also can overcome the skepticism of those who see the rule as a narrow slogan from the start. The rule can do much more than expected, it turns out, when its far-reaching implications are made explicit. Universalization, in principle, reduces to absurdity in this sense. This is what philosophical research on the matter turns up. One liability concerns justice. Wishing forgiveness, or at least to be given a second chance, has much to be said for it.
A kind of paradox results, which Christians will recall from the Parable of the Laborers in the vineyard Matthew The rule provides a moral advantage to both punisher and perpetrator in this case. Looking across situations, imagining the social practices and legitimate expectations that result, social members who commit offenses will suffer the luck of the draw.
The accountability mechanism of society will not establish a uniform policy of punishment or recompense. You got judge X or you mugged a nice guy—wish I had. For moral individualists or libertarians, this is no problem.
Who can complain about getting either fair treatment or beneficial treatment? We accept this discretionary arrangement in many everyday settings. Consider how this same sense of being mistreated and perhaps resentful will arise in most small groups of peers. Why the favoritism—you value her that much more than me?
And that is unjust. Moral liberals will be especially offended by this result. As with many conflicts between moral camps, both sides have a point, which each side seems committed not to acknowledge.
And thus far, no way of integrating these rival positions has gained general consensus. Like any general principle, perhaps, the golden rule also seems incapable of distinguishing general relationships and responsibilities from special ones—responsibilities toward family members, communities of familiars and co-workers, not the wide world of strangers. A proper explanatory principle will allow us to derive such corollaries from its core rationale.
But the golden rule falls short: it is truly a rule, not a principle. Compare it with the Utilitarian grounding principle of maximizing good. Maximizing is an ideal logic of reason. Good is an ideal of value of value. We can imagine how a most rational approach to value would promote special situations and relationships, why it would function differently there than in other situations, and why such situations and relationships have special value.
Additional good results from family and friendship institutions when members treat each other as special, and especially well. This is difficult at best, and not clearly a reliable way to maximizing good. It may detract from the good in fact. Also, what is the rationale for treating others as well as those closest to us? Why is showing favoritism toward our favorites a problem?
The golden rule itself does not say or explain. In work situations, are we to ignore who is the boss or supervisor, who is the rank-and-file employee, who is the support staff doing clerical or janitorial work?
These are serious problems for the golden rule. At a minimum, corollaries would have to be added to the rule explaining how roles and relationships figure in. Treat others as you would choose to be treated in the established social role you each occupy and its legitimate expectations, mother, father, or teacher to children and vice versa, spouses and friends to each other, peer co-workers, supervisor to rank-and-file employees and vice versa, and so forth.
Alan Gewirth has proposed a rule in which we focus on mutual respect for our generic rights alone. This would leave all sorts of other choices to other rationales or to our discretion that the golden rule does not, placing restraints on the rule that it would not currently acknowledge. Both of these alternatives have horrible consequences for the golden rule however. Rights simply do not cover enough ethical behavior to rule out forms of psychological cruelty, callousness, and interpersonal exclusion.
The reciprocity they guarantee is compatible with most forms of face-to-face interaction that lack it, especially in public peer-relations such as the school or job site, but also in friendships and the family.
Where the ethics or ethos of a society is barbaric, and its hierarchies authoritarian, taking perspectives within roles legitimates these characteristics.
How should a superior race reciprocate with members of a near sub-human race? This inequality problem is egregious also in adhering to prevailing social reciprocity-conventions applying to roles. Neither ethically skilled role-taking nor empathy can set matters right. Despite its assets, there are further reasons to think that the general theory project is inappropriate for many ethical rationales, the golden rule being perhaps chief among them.
Its expose of golden rule faults is more misleading than helpful. General theory assumes that the true and deeper logic of a rationale comes out through generalization, which often is not the case. This should be obvious when theorists note that a rationale cannot avoid certain far-flung implications, no matter how alien or morally outrageous they seem.
Rationalist by nature, general theory also assumes that the structure or logic of the rationale is the thing, not its psychological function, emotive effect, or motivational power.
The fault here is not emphasizing rational components, but failing to integrate additional components into it adequately. And failing to provide a type of general explanation might not then be a failing. Besides, the golden rule is unnecessary to the general theoretical project, as Kant himself made clear in dismissing it, and in a mere footnote no less p. We can start with an ideal explanatory principle, ideally structured to capture the explanatory logic of equal consideration or perspective taking.
There is no need to generalize from commonsense, distorting a rule designed only for commonsense purposes, in a restricted locale. It allows us to strip bare what holds the golden rule together beneath surface content that often matters little to its substance. How we do unto our mother or our child or our co-worker, even when their basic personhood is most at stake, requires a remarkably different form of address to convey equal consideration.
Patronizing someone a parent in showing respect, can convey disrespect. These are essential moral matters, golden-rule matters, not just a matter of discretionary style. Unlike Kant, J. Obviously modern democratic constitutions have brought advancing the common good into line with securing individual rights simply by retaining both principles in their own terms and using each to regulate the other. Even the lush empathy of Utilitarian intent, so key to who sacrifices or willingly serves, was eventually ejected from its general theory.
The golden rule spirit may be one explanation. The apparent association between the golden rule and the maximizing super-principle came basically from the central role of compassion in early Utilitarian theorizing. When people become experienced with each other, recognizing common needs, hopes and fears, failures and successes, they are moved to act with mutual understanding.
This increases their like-mindedness and mutual identification in turn. The resulting sense of connection nurtures increasing indifference toward the narrow desires of those concerned, whether in oneself or others. Membership in, and contribution to shared community becomes defining.
This is how golden rule other-directedness and equality moves toward full mutuality in the pursuit of overall social good.
Like most key tenets of ethics, the golden rule shows two major sides: one promoting fairness and individual entitlement, conceived as reciprocity; the other promoting helpfulness and generosity to the end of social welfare. Both the Kantian and Utilitarian traditions focus on only one side, furthering the great distinctions in philosophical ethics—the deontology-teleology and justice-benevolence distinctions. For the general theory project, this one-sidedness is purposeful, a research tool for reductive explanation.
The Utilitarian, Charles Dickens, probably draped most golden-rule content and spirit over the utilitarian side in his Christmas Carol. Mankind was my business, the common welfare was my business; charity, mercy, forbearance and benevolence were, all, my business.
In a small way here, Dickens highlighted the direct and visible hand of Utilitarian economics in contrast to the invisible hand of Utilitarian Adam Smith and his capitalist economics—a hand Dickens found quite lacking in compassion or egalitarian benefit.
The each-is-to-count-for-one equality of the golden rule is portrayed as a proven, socially institutionalized means to social good. What speech more heartily hits the golden tones of the golden rule? What seems needed to philosophize ably about the golden rule, and its relatives are theoretical models fit for rules of thumb. These would be know-how models, defined by the conceptual work it draped around algorithms, operations, and steps in procedures for putting rules into effect.
As noted, these may be psychological rules for taking certain moral points of view, rules of problem solving, negotiation, making contributions to ongoing practices, interactions, and more unilateral actions.
These components would be given a context of use and interrelated in crucially different ways, with suggestions for interrelating them further. Illustrations would be provided of their application and misapplication, at high, medium, and low quality. The resulting combination would be provided overall structure and comprehensibility which would include the rationales needed to explain and justify its components. Rationales for applying the procedures would allow unique and flexible alliances among components fit for particular functions and novel situations.
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